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Glossary 
 
Batu adat  : (literally means customary’s stone) a set of customary leaders consists 
of 10 leaders represented Olilit and Fanumbi on equal representation 5 
leaders respectively. In the rituals, they arrange the seat like a boat 
sailing the sea.  
 
House : cluster of houses; smallest element of marga consisted of households. 
Several houses can assemble into a marga.  
 
Petuanan : the tract of land which is bestowed by the first settler to other dispersed 
group in order to make them joining the village. With this portion, the 
first settler may also offer seats in the ritual office. Petuanan in Olilit is 
controlled by marga groups.  
 
Mangfaluruk  : or land supervisor. He is appointed by marga groups who control 
specific petuanan area with main function is to grant a petuanan use. 
Technically he will do worship for somebody before starting any 
activities on the land.  
 
Marga : clan or lineage families consists of number of houses 
 
Soa : united of marga groups. Several soas assemble into a village.  
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Abstract 
 
 
 
This research discusses the transformation in customary tenure toward commercialization 
and appropriation in Olilit village, Tanimbar Islands. The study analyzes several factors 
leading to the customary institutional change. It also looks at the roles of actors shaping 
the changes and how the actor mostly the elites usurp the benefit from the process. 
 
Since the process of individualization has been a widespread trend and seems to be 
inevitable in the future, the research suggests the community to think carefully regarding 
their decision toward customary land. Any decisions they made should be based on 
voluntary with sufficient information at hand. This research also suggests the community 
to invest themselves in order to deal with the livelihood change after having no access to 
the land. 
 
Chapter 1 
General background 
Historically, many communal lands have been undergoing a transition process toward 
individual property. The most important force was agriculture commercialization and 
often accompanied by increasing population pressure on land (Bruce, 1988; Boserup, 
1981; Rosenzweig, Binswanger and McIntire,, 1988). This has led to gradual 
establishment of permanent right over the land under shifting cultivation system through 
new commercial crops1. At the same time, the land gained a substantial value causing 
land competition with the influence of powerful groups in the society, they change the 
tenure institution. It is not surprising then the land becomes a commodity, enters the 
market and holds for individual ownership.  
 
On the other hand, other scholars try to explain the same reality from an urban 
development’s perspective. While the land is getting more importance for non-agriculture 
purposes especially due to urbanization (Tacoli, 1998), the urban area has expanded its 
space throughout urban periphery. As a consequence, the rural land encounters a pressure 
from urban development as reflected by the excessive transfer from communal land to 
individuals in urban areas. The examples from sub-saharan Africa indicate the massive 
transfer from customary tenure to individual property occurred in urban areas (Durand-
Laserve, 2003; Obala and Kinyungu, 2003; and Kironde, 2003).  
 
With reference to these models and facts, rural people in Indonesia have encountered 
similar problems. Land still becomes an issue with the fact that many people in Indonesia 
live in rural areas and the access to land are mostly mediated by group control under 
customary land management. At the same time, many rural areas are in the midst of 
pressure from urban development.  
 
Furthermore, access to the customary land entails some dilemmas. While groups control 
over customary land might create exclusion to minority groups, the land most of the time 
is inalienable. Whereas the land provides the households with source of income, a 
valuable asset, a source of foods and an insurance against shocks (De Janvry et al., 
2001:4-6), the land individualization would leave several questions of livelihood 
                                                 
1
 See further discussion by Otsuka and Place (2001); Otsuka and Quisumbing (2001); Quisumbing et al. 
(2001); and Platteau (1996). 
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sustainability. How will the people cope with the new land relation and will they be able 
to get a livelihood out of the land-based occupations?  
 
Despite these dilemmas, the land issue has been rejuvenated through the course of history 
so as the effects of land individualization remains an unfinished business.  
 
Brief description of case study 
The case study is about the story of people in Olilit village, Tanimbar Islands who are 
experiencing the process of individualization of their customary land. The access to the 
land for Olilit society is managed under customary land tenure, namely petuanan. 
However, over the past 60 years, the Olilit community has been losing its control over 
their petuanan through various ways. 
 
The communal land has been transferred to private property and mostly is taken by the 
outsiders living in the town nearby, Saumlaki. While the town is developing as a result of 
newly established district government, the detached customary lands are used for urban 
housing and settlement. Moreover, the urban land use becomes more intensive since 
public infrastructures such as road, hospital and district offices also require land with a 
lot of space. 
 
Some problems arise after the lands have been individualized. This has to do with the 
changing livelihood of the people. At this moment, they still depend on agriculture 
sectors but then it becomes a concern on how they are going to live after they have lost 
their control over the land. At the same time, much of the lands are exactly converted into 
non-agriculture purposes.  
 
In the light of this, what happen to the Olilit community was very obvious. The process 
of change has undergoing so far hence, the research is trying to find out how the process 
has been taken place, what the impacts are and who gets benefits from such process. 
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Figure 1 Map of Olilit Village 
 
 
Source: Tanimbar Land Use Project (2004); www.multimap.com (2003)  
Objective and Research Question 
This research has two main objectives that is: first, it aims to understand the main 
features of customary land in Tanimbar Islands, its relationship among the people and the 
land, social structure and distributional pattern of resources. Second, it intends to explore 
the processes of land individualization and figure out what the impacts are to the life of 
the people in the rural area. In order to reach these objectives, research question is raised 
herein:  
 
What are the factors driving the process of customary land individualization in Olilit 
village and who gets benefit from it? 
 
Relevance and justification 
Land commoditization is still relevant in the developing world despite the fact that it has 
been more significant in the developed world. The land still becomes an issue since it 
represents not only economic value but also social and cultural value. Therefore in the 
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context of customary land, commoditization would change the configuration of access 
and social relationship related to land use. Furthermore, this research offers another point 
of view looking at land individualization process as part of an episode of the urban 
development. The discussion is still relevant and useful for contributing to the debate of 
rural change while the rural areas in other part of the world and also in Indonesia have 
been undergoing the similar process of change. 
 
Brief analytical framework 
In analyzing the process of the customary land individualization, a number of 
frameworks are used in this paper. First, it concern with access framework (Ribot and 
Peluso, 2003) which is helpful explain the structure and access mechanism enable 
somebody to get benefit whether or not he holds the rights to the resources. Second, the 
access to resources is also mediated by institution structure comprises of three elements 
(Feder and Feeny, 1991). The main focus in this paper is the institutional arrangement 
and assuming the constitutional order and normative codes are given.  
 
A third framework concerns with urban development process and its relationship with 
rural change. In line with this, Tacoli (1998) discussed the modernization followed by 
urbanization process which provides an explanation of customary land transfer and 
spatial pressure in the urban periphery areas. The discussion expands to include 
government policy as one of the factors shaping the customary land use and rural change.  
On top of that, the last framework is trying to analyze who gets benefit from customary 
land individualization in Olilit. The discussion under public choice approach (Grindle and 
Thomas, 1991) is useful to analyze the tendency of the elites seeks the incentives to 
maintain their power in the society.  
 
Research method 
The research is based primarily on a qualitative methodology. First, the selection of the 
study location needs to be explained. The site has an importance regarding to its location. 
It is located outside the Java Island and has different type of land management where 
customary land management is common in this area. In addition, Olilit village is located 
at a remote island which encounters transportation problems and access to the market. 
Despite its drawbacks, the land commercialization is still going on as well as land 
appropriation for public use. Apart from any noises produced in the center of the country, 
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the land commercialization in the remote area is likely to be neglected and forgotten. 
Therefore it is relevant for the research to show that the land individualization process 
could happen anywhere else including within customary land tenure. 
 
Second, the research employs both primary and secondary data. Primary data were 
acquired during the fieldwork in the Olilit village by using semi structure interviews, 
group discussion and informal conversation. The primary data were gathered mainly from 
interview with new elected village head, former village secretary, businessmen in the 
city, the villagers especially those who have ever experienced land transactions. Group 
discussion among youth groups and the elders were also conducted to get more insight on 
the study topic.  
 
In addition to that, a series of the interview was also conducted to interview the officer in 
district government. They are: staffs of agriculture agency; head of District Land Board 
(BPN); head of General Affair of District Office (Kabag Umum); and officer in Public 
Works Agency (PU). The information to collect was about the Saumlaki’s main road 
project and some issues regarding land compensation scheme. Last but not least, some 
informal conversations were conducted where feasible. 
 
To support primary data, the secondary data were also collected from Tanimbar Land Use 
Planning Project Report, district statistical data, national statistics, internet sources and 
literature study.  
 
Third, the information collected were analyzed upon completion of each interview and 
organized in the interview log. Further analysis was based on this log and several phone 
communications after leaving the field were made to seek some clarifications. The 
analysis was focused on the aspect of shaping the access to customary land and the notion 
of the elites capture. These were based on the case study concerning three modes of land 
transfer: kinship relation mode; typical land selling-buying; and land appropriation by 
government for public infrastructure.  
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Chapter 2 
An Overview of Olilit Community 
 
Olilit village is located at the southern tip of Yamdena Island in the Tanimbar Islands. 
This village is only a tea-drink away from Saumlaki, the district capital. Roads make it 
possible for people to travel from the village to the district capital. In terms of population, 
this village is larger compared to other villages in the island. It has an approximately 
1,000 households and around 4,000 inhabitants.  
 
Olilit village consists of two settlement regions, West Olilit (WO) and East Olilit (EO). 
Prior to 1946, people were all living in WO until the establishment of the sub-district 
capital in Saumlaki. Although WO and EO became two separate regions, both are still 
under a single village government. 
 
The villagers give utmost importance in understanding their roots hence; Olilit’s history 
is being passed on from on generation to another for ages. According to them, the 
Tanimbarese people do not originate from this island. Myths say that people came to this 
island through a series of migration, sailing across archipelago and united with other 
groups forming a new settlement in the present home (Mc Kinnon, 1991:55). 
 
At present, several groups can be found in Olilit namely, Iyat-Taborat;  Ngrias or 
Ivakdalam dayar; Maselar and Mpamrenan; Nifmasar, Ibyaru, Rumray, and Batmwerar;  
Lakteru, Baritu, Laratmase and Rangkore; and an independent group called Ndriti and 
Kempirmase. These groups used to live separately but after a series of warfare and 
alliance, they united and established five soa called Fanumbi, Futuembun, 
Futunanembun, Ivakdalam, and Waranmaselembun. This was commemorated by 
changing the name of the old village from Lartutul into Olilit which means round2.  
During the union, the following pledge called Ngrimase (the words of gold) was 
declared: 
 
                                                 
2
 After consolidation, the people use ‘Olilit’ for an external affair but for an internal affair they use ‘Olilit-
Fanumbi. The name of Olilit refers to the united of Soa Waranmaselembun, Futuembun, Ivakdalam and 
Futunanembun whereas Fanumbi was formerly different group, a consolidation of several groups (Mc 
Kinnon 1991:67).  
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1. Tal da o lan lese, ma tal dol o lan lese (we together go to the land, only 
one Olilit, as well as we together go to the sea) 
2. fwalir lan nim bubu roat na dol ma fwalir lan nim ampat werain nada 
(you are allowed to harvest your stone fish trap in the sea as well as from your 
estate in the mainland) 
 
This pledge denotes an important wisdom on how the people in the community should 
live their lives. Moreover, it serves as a basis of an institutional arrangement on the 
allocation and management of resources especially the land estates. At this time, people 
were engaged in subsistence farming, cultivation of estates for coconut and small scale 
fisheries exploiting stone fish traps in the sea. 
 
Figure 2 Olilit village from the top 
 
 
Socio Economic Situation 
The main activity of Olilit families is mainly on agriculture sector, with nearly 83 percent 
of total families in 2003 (PODES, 2003). Although it is a dominant livelihood, this 
doesn’t mean that they just focus on this activity without doing other livelihood. In fact, 
the seasonality of income is important to note since some householders also work in the 
town nearby in order to get immediate cash income. They use some of their time after 
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cultivation period to do paid-work in non-farm sectors in the town while the women will 
be responsible for nursing the crops in the field. 
 
The food crop agriculture has contributed a small amount of cash income since most of 
the harvests are consumed by the households. Some food crops are also sold especially 
vegetables but the income derived from it is not necessarily aimed for capital 
accumulation. Therefore, we can say that the people in rural Olilit are still live on 
subsistence. 
 
The general pattern of income distribution in the southern Yamdena can be seen in Figure 
3. The figure shows that the rural global income is divided into various income 
generating activities. Trading copra (dried coconut kernel) and marine fisheries remain an 
important contribution to the household income. Besides farming activities, there are 
several activities which are considered as rural non-farm income such as craftsmen, 
unskilled labor, driver and entrepreneur. The figure also shows that the non-farm 
activities are important contributors to the global income. 
 
Figure 3 Global Income Distribution in Southern Yamdena 
 
Driver
1%
Craftsmen
4%
Livestock
3%
Food crop
9%
Ship Crew
0.3%
Copra
12%
Wood Carver
1%
Unskilled Labor
1%
Entrepreneur
9%
NTFP
7%
Timber
4%
Teacher/Civic 
Servant
15%
Fisheries
34%
 
Source: Shantiko et.al., Tanimbar Land Use Planning Project (2004) 
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Figure 4 Distribution of Activities in Olilit community 
Farmers
76%
Army
1%
Civil Servant, 
mainly Teacher
12%
Fishermen
8%
Craftmen and 
Wage Labor
3%
 
Source: Village secretary, interview (2006) 
 
In Olilit’s case, farming still plays an important role (see Figure 4). In relation to the 
recent trend, other activities besides farming are also growing, for instance craft making 
and wage labor. 
 
From these figures, it can be said that the main livelihood of Olilit people is based on 
natural resources extraction, which is farming and fishing. But other livelihood activities 
are growing and attracting many rural people. This is partly due to the growth of the 
nearest district capital, Saumlaki. Another new livelihood that is favorable for Olilits is 
motor-taxi driver (ojek). There are about 120 persons developing ojek as their main 
livelihood; many of which are youth (Belay, interview). 
 
Socio Political Organization 
Leadership is a central idea in traditional society including in Tanimbar society 
(Purwanto, 2005:26-27). The leaders are social, political and religious leaders at the same 
time. They are responsible in managing various aspects of human life such as social, 
culture, economics, defense as well as natural resource allocation. This means that the 
traditional leaders plays significant role in Olilit society. The natures of such leaderships 
are elite domination, single and absolute authority and often inherited. 
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In this context, the leadership structure is manifested into the boat sailing the sea. Each 
crew represents a particular leader with specific roles and responsibilities. This idea is 
translated into a ritual office located at the square in the middle of the village. There are 
ten seats in the ritual office of Olilit arranged based on left and right positions. After a 
village union, the ritual office was also merged: Olilit sits on the left side and Fanumbi on 
the right side. Each row represents a particular function and role among these are the 
main speaker (mangatanuk silai), second speaker (mangatanuk marumat), prayer and 
sacrificer (mangsompe double as village’s mangfaluruk), herald (mangfwayak), and last 
speakers (wilin fian-wilin bayal). 
 
Figure 5 Structure and Organization of Ritual Office in Olilit Village 
Clan futunanembun
House luturmele
c. Ivakdalam
h. malisngoran
c. Ivakdalam
h. lartutul
c. Waranmaselembun
h. fadirsyair
c. Waranmaselembun
h. ranmalai
Seaward
Olilit
Clan Nifmasar
House sarbunan
c. Ibyaru
h. belay
c. Batmwerar
h. batfutu
Landward
Fanumbi
c. Batmwerar
h. somarwain
c. Ibyaru
h. batsire
First speaker
Second speaker
Prayer and sacrificer
herald
Last speaker
Seaward
Olilit
Landward
Fanumbi
  
Source: Belay, Interview (2006) 
 
The structure in Figure 5 illustrates how the decision might come to an agreement in a 
hierarchical order. The meeting must be opened by the first speaker and continued by 
other speakers in sequence. In the meantime, nobody especially those who sit outside the 
boat, is allowed to interrupt the conversation until given the permission to do so. At the 
end of the meeting, the last speaker would close the meeting and summarize the decision. 
Towards the end of the meeting, the herald is responsible for disseminating the result to 
the whole society which binds the community.  
 
All positions on the stone boat are important but with respect to the land, the officer 
called mangfaluruk has more importance compared to the others. Formally, the 
mangfaluruk plays a role in the village meeting but is also responsible for maintaining the 
relation between the physical and spiritual world by worshiping and making the sacrifice. 
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In reality, it is the one who gives consent for any land use be it for agriculture purposes or 
other purposes such as building a house. 
 
Land access in the Olilit Society 
The sections below will elaborate on land access of the Olilit community. This will 
explain the development of petuanan at an early period. It will also discuss the role of a 
distinct land supervisor as well as the distributional rights over petuanan. Issues on land 
ownership and rights to trees will also be covered. 
The formation of petuanan  
There are at least three ways to obtain the right to control a land, they are: 1) being the 
first settler; 2) join other groups as an exchange of a portion; and 3) acquisition from the 
warfare (Purwanto, 2004:87). It was clear that the first settler could claim a tract of land 
in a particular area. Since the area was very large, it is difficult to control and defend the 
area from the occupation of other groups. Therefore, the first settler will attempt to call 
other groups to join by bestowing the position in the ritual office. A ‘stone’ seat, as well 
as a tract of land or petuanan will be offered as an option for joining (McKinnon, 
1991:65). 
 
According to Purwanto (2005:79) the following are the different levels by which the 
petuanan is controlled: a) household; b) marga; c) soa; and village level. As a concept of 
territorial property, petuanan is controlled by one or more margas who are connected to 
each other through elder and younger brother relationship (Purwanto, 2005:77; Mc 
Kinnon, 1991). This is very common in Yamdena Island but the most relevant aspect in 
Olilit society is wherein the marga controls the petuanan land. 
 
The rights to control over the petuanan are exclusively determined. It is derived from the 
history of the ancestors translated to social structure in the society (see Socio Political 
Organization above). Those who control are small number of marga-owners as oppose to 
several marga-users who have user rights. To use the land, the marga-users are obliged to 
ask the consent of the marga-owner. As a distinct feature, only the marga-owner employs 
the officer called mangfaluruk (see Appendix 1). 
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The role of mangfaluruk 
In his study over customary land in Indonesia, van Vollenhoven identified an important 
officer acting as a land supervisor (Haar, 1948:91). This officer has a power over the land 
and uses this power to protect anybody in the group from any harms and unintended 
events. In the Olilit community, the officer is called mangfaluruk. 
 
It is a belief that the petuanan land is not only about physical dimension but also spiritual. 
That is why there is a need to ask the consent of the mangfaluruk before the first use of 
the land. It has to do with the belief that any harm from the spirits could disturb the 
human activities on the land. Thus, mangfaluruk would mediate the spirits not to make 
any harm. In practice, they will worship and sacrifice by trickling palm wine to the 
ground. Having this responsibility, the mangfaluruk became an important actor in land 
allocation in the Olilit society. 
Distribution of rights over petuanan in Olilit village 
Customary land in Olilit recognizes both individual and communal control over the land. 
They are different in arrangement but exist simultaneously creating a complex customary 
land relation. Communal management is known traditionally by the term makan bersama 
(Lit: eat together). It is a practice by which the marga-users have the opportunity to 
utilize and take benefit from the plot they managed although the plot is under 
authorization of a particular marga-owner (Purwanto, 2005:81). The plot later on can be 
claimed into individual ownership when the user marked the plot with perennial crops. 
 
This brings the notion of distinct rights between land and trees. The trees grown on the 
land also have different attributes. One year crops such as tubers, paddy, and vegetables 
are temporary in nature; it can not be used as a basis of individual land claim as oppose to 
perennial crops such as coconut, mango and breadfruit. This has to do with the fact that 
the working land might fallow after a series of cultivation usually three consecutive 
years. Moreover, the fallow land provides an access to the land for other members of the 
community. Thus the fallow land is considered as a communal property. Despite its 
communality, the use of this land is bounded to the control of a particular marga who in 
turn controls a specific petuanan area.  
 
On the other hand, the household has some choice after using the land for several years. 
They may open another new plot, convert the old plot into a coconut plantation or 
simultaneously open new annual crops’ field. 
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Perennial crops provide individual ownership and are more permanent in terms of bundle 
of rights. The rights attributed to it among others are right to use, right to alienate and 
right to inherit. Furthermore, such rights can be transferred fully to the new owner in 
through commercialization. 
 
At the beginning while the land is still a communal property, the profits derived from the 
it are treated differently from the profits derived from the tree. The tree profits are 
individual whereas the land profits are shared to the society (Belay, interview). Later on, 
it becomes a common practice when the land had been marked by coconut plantation; the 
planter gets control over the trees as well as the land concurrently (Purwanto, 2005:81). 
 
Conversely, the customary right has a different arrangement for outsiders. They are 
granted usufruct right combined with land inalienability. In Olilit’s case, the outsiders 
living in the area (Saumlaki town) were granted the user’s right and can get benefits from 
the annual crops; although making coconut plantation or planting any perennial crops 
were prohibited (Fasse, interview). 
 
It should be noted that the complexity between the communal and individual rights has 
been recognized in petuanan system. The resources in the sea and in the land are vested 
in the community but every member of Olilit can access such resources. Vacant areas are 
considered as communal property and it can be utilized by those who are willing to 
exploit them. At the same time, individual ownership is recognized especially the area 
that has been marked like the stone fish trap in the sea or coconut estate in the mainland. 
 
To summarize this section, some features of petuanan in Olilit have been identified. The 
first feature is that petuanan manages land access through communal management vested 
in particular marga groups. Such marga groups employ a specific officer called 
mangfaluruk acting as the land supervisor. At the same time, individual ownership is 
recognized specifically those areas that have been cultivated. Another issue is that the 
land and the tree have different rights. The land is more communal but the trees are 
completely individual. The type of crops is an indication whether the land will be used 
temporarily or permanently. 
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Historical Dimension of Agriculture Commercialization 
As was mentioned in the unification pledge, coconut is an important cultivation in the 
ancient Olilit. Situated in Tanimbar Islands in 1900s, Prothero (1920:48) recorded that 
extensive coconut plantation were lined in the shore area. It was a famous plantation 
which gained an expression as ‘green gold’ (Heersink 1999 cited in Trouwen, 2001:175). 
It seemed that the coconut provided is a source of income for the community. It is 
interesting for to look back to the Dutch colonial era where trade from outer islands of 
Indonesia played a significant role. 
 
In the period 1900-1942, several major export crops were rubber, copra, coffee and 
pepper (Trouwen, 2001:167). Interestingly, the export was based on indigenous crops as 
opposed to large plantations showing that two probable processes might have taken place, 
either the indigenous people had planted the crops by themselves or the colonists 
introduced the cash crops to the people. Whatever it is, the bottom line is a process of 
agriculture commercialization had been started.  
 
Compared to other products, coconut was a relatively new cash crop in colonial trading in 
the late nineteenth centuries altough it was not a new crops in Indonesia. The scale of 
commodities trading from Moluccas archipelago for export purposes was relatively low 
since the transportation costs were very high. In fact, the scale of inter-islands trading 
remained significant especially to Java (Trouwen, 2001:309). 
 
Based on this historical review, several points can be raised. First, even though the 
coconut was already planted before the nineteenth century, it was only during the colonial 
era that it became a major cash crop. This illuminates the reality that agriculture 
commercialization had taken place even in remote areas like Tanimbar Island. Second, 
the cultivation of coconut under customary land management shaped the tenure 
arrangement as well as the patterns of land control. 
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Chapter 3 
Theoretical Background 
Access Framework 
The theoretical approach adopted in this paper is the Theory of Access by Ribot and 
Peluso (2003). They view access as a bundle of power as opposed to the conventional 
approach on property by looking at bundle of rights. This standard property approach 
focuses on the rights to claim a benefit or income stream (Bromley and Feeny, 1992:4) 
consisting of a set of multiple rights operated with respect to one particular resource such 
as access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation right (Ostrom and Schlager, 
1996:130). 
 
While Ribot and Peluso (2003:153) define access as the ability to benefit from things, it 
also explores the notion of power which influences various mechanisms, processes and 
social relations shaping one’s ability to take benefit from resources. Thus, its focus on 
ability rather than the rights makes it a comprehensive account of social relationship. 
 
On the other hand, Ostrom and Schlager (1996:130-33) show how bundle of rights are 
allocated differently for different right-holders. They explained that each rights holder 
would not hold a complete set of rights. For instance, it is possible to have access right 
without withdrawal right; so as having exclusion right without alienation right. Among 
the holders, the owner is the highest authority since it has full set of rights in contrast 
with the authorized entrant who only has an entrant access and enjoys non-substantive 
benefit (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 The bundle of rights associated with the right holders 
 Owner Proprietor Claimant Authorized 
user 
Authorized 
entrant 
Access X X X X X 
Withdrawal X X X X  
Management X X X   
Exclusion X X    
Alienation X     
Source: Adapted from Ostrom and Schlager (1996:133) 
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This ‘bundle of right’ approach shows some shortcomings among others. It cannot 
explain how external interests are able to appropriate the resources considering that the 
resources are usually controlled and managed by the people within the groups. It means 
that these external groups may only be an authorized user or entrant but they are able to 
override the other holder’s bundle of rights. Similarly, it is unable to explain how some 
users might use indirect means to extract benefit from the resources like benefits derived 
from illegal activities. 
 
Hence, access theory offers a set of framework that can explain some of these 
shortcomings. Ribot and Peluso (2003:164) employ the structural and relational access 
mechanisms which influence access to resources (Figure 6). They argue that access 
approach is more helpful to analyze how somebody generates benefit from the things 
whether or not he holds the right to them (Ribot and Peluso, 2003:154). 
 
Figure 6 Structural and relational access mechanism 
Access to resources
technology
capital
market
Labor and labor opportunityknowledge
authority
Social identity
Negotiation and 
Social relation 
 
Source: adapted from Ribot and Peluso (2003:165-172) 
 
Furthermore, the ability to benefit from resources is also subject to political-economic 
and cultural frames of the particular access to resources in question. Several factors are 
also identified, they are: technology, capital, market, labor opportunity, knowledge, 
authority, social identity and social relation. Access to one or more of these factors will 
shape the access to the resources and the ability to benefit from them.  
 
Among these, the access to social identity is the most important in a traditional society 
because it mediated through membership in a community or groups such as based on age, 
gender, ethnicity, religion, status, profession or other attributes that constitute social 
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identity (Ribot and Peluso, 2003:171). In line with this access to social identity, access to 
negotiation and social relation provides a means for the group to negotiate and mediate 
by friendship, trust, reciprocal obligation, patronage and dependence (ibid.:172). These 
particular accesses can be use to explain the interaction of actors incustomary land 
management. 
 
Property as an Institution 
To begin with overall institutional structure in the society and economy, Feder and Feeny 
(1991:136) define three basic categories of institution: (1) constitutional order which 
refers to the fundamental rules in which society is organized; (2) institutional 
arrangements that are made based on rules defined in constitutional order such as laws, 
regulations, contracts, associations and property right; and (3) normative codes which 
refer to cultural values that legitimize the arrangement and constraint behavior.  
 
Property relation is not only relation between persons and things but also social relation 
(Sayer, 1995:146). It explains the interaction of the right holders with the things that 
defines what must and must not do, the rights, the duties, the power, the privilege and so 
on (Feder and Feeny, 1991:136). In relation to that, property can also be seen as an 
institution where rules and regulation is determined in order to manage social interaction 
(North 1990 cited in Hanna, Folke and Maler, 1996:1). 
 
At this point, the institution can be viewed as an aggregation of consensus among the 
actors in concern. But the benefit from the institution might not be distributed equally 
among individual or social groups in the society. This further creates conflicts as an 
inherent part of institutional change between dominant and marginal groups who attempt 
to challenge status quo in order to improve the situation (Lesorogol, 2006:5-6; 
Fitzpatrick, 2006:1008).  
 
A quite similar point of view, Angelsen (1997:9) explains the institutional change is a 
product of class structure and struggle. This is a radical view in terms of viewing at 
trajectory of property right institution toward private property right result in polarization 
between wage labor class and capitalist agriculture class (Ellis, 2000:23).  
 
On the other hand, liberal view tends to look institutional change as part of societal 
demand based on rational motives (Firmin-Sellers, 1996:7). In pre-capitalist society, the 
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property right of the land was preserved and controlled by clans and lineage families 
showing that the system had gained from underdevelopment of land market.  
 
Explaining some framework for institutional change above mentioned help to address the 
factors drives the institutional change within communal or customary land tenure in 
Olilit. However, this paper will not deal with constitutional order and normative codes 
and would treat them as a given.  
Transaction costs 
According to the neoclassical approach, society makes decision based on rational 
behavior. The model assumes that everyone has an access to information and it is 
perfectly distributed (IDS, 2006:1). It is expected that by having complete information, 
the decisions of the household would reflect a rational choice. This has been criticized by 
the neo-institutional approach (NIE) which attempted in making neoclassical economics 
more historical, realistic and social in its approach (Ankarloo, 2002). The central tenet of 
NIE lies on the argument of imperfect information leading to the occurrence of the 
transaction costs. Therefore, the institution exists as a central explanation and a means to 
reduce transaction and information costs (Stein 1994:1835; Bardhan, 1989:4). 
 
Polanyi points that the transaction mode is not associated with transaction costs. Indeed it 
is, in the words of North (1977 cited in Eggertsson, 1990:286) that transaction mode can 
be considered as a substitute of price making mechanism. The mode itself, as Polanyi 
argued, comprises of administered trade, reciprocal obligatory between kin and friends 
and so forth. The use of this mode is common in the absent of market prices.  
 
The transaction costs are unavoidable as the economy is growing and the networks 
expand larger. The increase of transaction costs occurs to collect information and the 
opportunistic behavior would be likely to happen during the exchange process. This is not 
the case for traditional society in a simple and closed economy. The simpler the networks 
the lower the transaction costs and it prevents opportunistic behavior like cheating, 
shirking and moral hazard.  
 
The analysis of transaction costs should help to understand particular mode of land 
transfer under commercial transaction. While incomplete information is prevalent in rural 
areas, the land market is not working very well and unable to give an indication of 
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equilibrium land prices. In fact, the people rely on traditional mode of transaction with 
personal network as one of the instruments.  
 
Land Property and Its Relation with Urban Development 
This section will discuss land commercialization in the context of urban development as 
well as analyze rural-urban interaction. Studying urban and rural areas is important 
because these two are related in many ways. It will provide several insights in 
understanding how the cities are growing and its implications to social, economic and 
spatial aspects for areas. 
 
The city expansion can be seen as a result of modernization and development. This 
argument has played an important role during the1950s onwards in forstering economic 
growth (Nurske, 1953; Lewis, 1954 cited in Tacoli, 1998:150). One of the effects of 
modernization is urbanization. At that time, it was perceived as a normal consequence in 
terms of shifting agriculture labor to manufacture industries but later it was found that the 
absorption of agriculture labor to industries was far less than expected.  
 
Nowadays, urbanization has implications regarding to spatial aspect. Urban areas were 
enlarged over its official boundaries. The space between countryside and the cities or the 
peri-urban area has been developed to provide housing needs especially for the 
commuters; it is cheaper in terms of transportation costs in accessing the city from this 
area. As a result, the land started gaining its value and land use in the rural areas is 
increasingly influenced by the real-estate development. In addition to that, the increasing 
value of land is also aggravated by speculative behavior in anticipating urban expansion 
(Tacoli, 1998:160).  
 
In relation to the institutions that govern land allocation in rural areas, the urban 
expansion would induce the change of institutional arrangement on customary land which 
is common in rural areas. This is one of the external threats that would be encountered by 
rural society as urban and rural interaction becomes more intensive (Fuys, Mwangi and 
Dohrn, 2006;14). 
The Role of the State 
While institutional change is seen as a product of the struggle, the state and community 
are seen in the conflict situation. In the context of land management, it is articulated with 
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the existence of dual system and the tension between statutory laws and customary laws 
(Angelsen 1997:10-11; Ezigbalike, Rakai and Wiliamson, 1996). In many developing 
countries, such tensions are aggravated by the ignorance of customary institution hence 
creating deeper pressure on the common resources (Fuys, Mwangi and Dohrn, 2006:15).  
 
Apart from the state’s function as a social planner; the state may also exist as an 
instrument for powerful groups. The latter function known as predatory state has been an 
explanation to the transformation of many forms of communal property (Angelsen, 
1997:10). 
 
From these two approaches neither the dual system nor the predatory state benefits from 
the communal society instead both are often neglected. In these systems, the state is so 
powerful and dominant in the policy making process making the community less 
important and invisible from policy process. Another consequence is that many 
customary societies that have to deal with the state are prone to appropriation.  
 
This becomes relevant in the context of recent decentralization policy in Indonesia after 
the parliament passed the law 22/1999. To implement the law, a set of authority has been 
passed from central authority to the district government enabling them to provide a wide 
range of public service by their own (GTZ-SfDM, 2006). In practice, the decentralization 
policy has formed numerous district governments. Those governments are now 
responsible for their own budget, expenditure as well as local policies. Given the 
autonomy of local government, in many cases local government struggle for district 
income (PAD) leading to an excessive exploitation of natural resources (Suwondo, 
2002:3).   
 
Both the state and district government represent the same power and ability to influence 
the communal society. While the central government distributes some authorities to the 
district governments, they could play the role of the state at the local level.  
 
Therefore this paper would argue that the state plays an important role to institutional 
change on customary land. At the same time, current decentralization policy provides a 
means for the local government to influence institutional arrangement and appropriate the 
land for public use. 
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Commodity and Commoditization 
To find out how something becomes a commodity is the first stage before looking at how 
commoditization takes place. Quoting to Marx: 
 
“A commodity is, in the first place, an object outside us, a thing that by its properties satisfies 
human wants of some sort or another. The nature of such wants, whether, for instance, they spring 
from the stomach or from fancy, makes no difference. Neither are we here concerned to know how 
the object satisfies these wants, whether directly as means of subsistence, or indirectly as means of 
production”3. 
 
Commodity and values are interlinked in a way that enables the commodity to be 
exchanged. Another similar approach explains the commodity as an object for sale. 
Therefore, commoditization would be taken place in the market (Polanyi, 1965:72). In 
the market, a commodity has an attribute of price which is determined from the 
interaction of supply-demand mechanism. 
 
On the other hand, this approach has some weaknesses among others it focuses only on 
the commodity translated into economic goods. Thus it can be said that it is materialist in 
approach. Some scholars offer contradictory view where the commodities are not 
necessarily entering commoditization process. Instead, commodities can be 
decommoditized into non-economic goods and situation (Davenport, 1986:105). For 
example, in the ritual ceremony, the served and blessed things are disconnected from the 
material world which are sacred and taboo for any commercialization. Likewise, any 
social pressures such as shame are relatively effective to prevent the things being 
commercialized (Verdery, 2004:149). 
 
This review shows that the idea of commodity will be useful to see how the value 
regarding to the land has been transformed from non-economic goods to material and 
economic goods. From that point, the contradiction would be elaborated to see how it 
works in the case study.  
How market affects rural change 
In relation to commoditization process, one must note that the process tempts the rural 
economy to integrate into the market4. This integration has an important implication to 
                                                 
3
 Karl Marx, Capital Volume One, http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch01.htm#S1 
accessed on 8 September 2006 at 7:59 AM 
4
 Some authors have been contributed to the discussion on the growing of money economy such as Netting 
(1993:163); Elson (1997:49); Cleary and Eaton (1996:48); Fitzpatrick (2002:171); and Crocombe (1971:6). 
 22 
the customary land institution in the rural areas. At least Baland and Platteau (1996: 270-
8) identify two processes which are going to happen. First, market integration erodes the 
ability of the communities to manage their communal resources effectively. After some 
commodities gained commercial value due to market penetration, the institutional 
arrangement would be distorted and under pressure (Durand-Lasserve and Royston, 
2002).  
 
Second, the traditional authority pattern, village solidarity and social cohesion, and old 
magical belief would erode simultaneously. While traditional authority is very important 
there is a link between the damage of traditional authority and the collapse of institutional 
arrangement on communal resources. The reasons are the gradual appropriation of 
traditional authority by the government and the spread of modern education introducing 
new values to the society. 
 
As new values such as market value penetrates deeper, the social cohesion and solidarity 
among people are loosening. This is because market value tends to encourage 
individualistic behavior like fragmenting old cooperatives tie and to untying the 
individuals’ interest from those of social groups. 
 
After all, the erosion of old magical belief has an implication on ways in which people 
view the world. They might question the taboo and beliefs held by their father and 
forefathers. Hence, the institutional arrangement is often overridden since the taboo has 
little deterrent effect to any improper behavior.  
 
In this paper, the discussion of rural change is important to reveal the effect of rural 
integration into the market via commercialization. Since it doesn’t only change the 
relation between people and the resources but also between people of different 
generations. 
 
The Elites and Their Behavior 
Pareto denotes elites simply as "a class of the people who have the highest indices in their branch of 
activity"5. He also divided the elite class into governing elites represented by those who 
                                                 
5
 http://www2.pfeiffer.edu/~lridener/DSS/Pareto/PARETOW7.HTML last accessed on 18 November 2006 
at 12:46AM 
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directly and indirectly take part in government and the non-governing elites who 
comprises the rest. The importance of looking at governing elites is that they are playing 
an important role to change the society. To what extent the change would be taken place 
depends on the types of the elites govern the society. As Pareto noted, the society 
changes faster when governed by the speculator elites rather than the rentiers elites 
(Delaney, 1971:2). 
 
The elites capture indicates the problems that are often taken place in the situation where 
the powerful actors intercept the benefit of the resources from particular groups in the 
society (Johnson and Start, 2001:12). Bardhan and Mookherjee (1999:2) illuminate the 
discussion by giving an emphasis on the reverse hierarchical capture meaning that the 
elite capture is more excessive at the lower level of government. This has to do with low 
transparency as a result of low media coverage at the lowest level.  
 
In addition to that, the same problem occurs in the small society where it is governed by 
traditional leaders consisted of small number of individuals (Madison 1937 cited in 
Bardhan and Mookerjee, 2005:14). Whether the benefits are captured by the government 
elites or the local elites, both are disadvantage mostly for the poor, the marginal groups 
and the less protected minorities. 
 
From above discussion, it is clear that the elites involved on the act of governing 
comprising among others undertake decision making activities. In relation to this, the 
approaches below are suitable to explain the process of decision making and the behavior 
of the elites. First, society-centered approach looks at the change in policy as a result of 
change in decisions shaped by the relationship of power between individuals, groups or 
classes in the society (Grindle and Thomas, 1991:19). The class analysis is one of the 
implications; The change of policy is seen as the result of interaction between power and 
domination among social classes.  
 
Second, the pluralist approach explains the decisions made through the conflict, 
bargaining and coalition among the groups in the society. This assumes the actors 
involved are self interest therefore negotiation is needed to bridge diverse interests. 
Platteau and Gaspart (2003:7) illustrate the situation faced by the leader and the 
grassroots called one-stage bargaining game. It operates through the leader makes an 
offer regarding the disbursed funds, however the grassroots need to accept the offer 
though it is small amount otherwise it ends up with nothing. 
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Third, public choice approach attempts to explain why the elites stay in their position and 
how they maintain their political support. The elites tend to maintain their influence by 
seeking strong incentive form whatever they had such as networks, resources and power 
(Johnson and Start, 2001:10). In fact, they use public resources as ‘a weapon to survival’ 
(Grindle and Thomas, 1991:25). Furthermore, the process leads to inefficiency, 
corruption and the worst are political instability and successive regime changes. 
 
Analytical Framework: A Synopsis 
The analytical framework is going to be used in this paper consists of several working 
concepts summarize as follow. The core framework concerns about customary land 
institution. The institutional structure will focus on institutional arrangement which 
consists of laws, regulations and contracts (Feder and Feeny, 1991). Hence the change of 
law, regulation and contract will be one indicator to institutional change. The argument 
here is that institutional change affects the customary land individualization process. 
  
Second, government policy has affected customary land institution through various ways, 
one of them is the government plays an important role in urban development. This is 
inseparable from the fact that modernization theory encourages the growth centralized in 
urban areas (Tacoli, 1998). As a consequence, the customary land in the urban periphery 
encounters a pressure from city expansion. This is relevant to explain the relationship of 
recent decentralization policy with customary land appropriation by local government.  
 
Third, by looking inside to petuanan in Olilit one will get an idea that the access to 
petuanan can be explained with access theory (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). It helps to 
understand how village members or even outsiders got access to the resources 
particularly the customary land. The access to the resources after all shapes how 
customary institution will be.  
 
On top of that, the elite behavior needs to be looked at in order to understand part of the 
story of customary land individualization in the Olilit village. Grindle and Thomas (1991) 
contribute to explain the tendency of elites to capture the benefit from the resources 
especially to maintain their power within society. The main concern of looking at elites is 
the governing elites.  
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Chapter 4 
Customary Land Individualization 
 
This chapter would be organized in the way that combining the research findings and 
analysis. First, it elaborates how the customary land individualization was taken place 
over time, followed by recent practices of individual transaction. The discussion 
enlightens some issues regarding land security and the motives of individual selling. 
After that, it discusses some modes of transfer and closed the discussion by putting the 
idea of the impacts and consequences for further discussion and analysis. The last two 
sections would argue that institutional change affects the land individualization process 
and explain who gets the most benefit from this process. Finally, the analysis attempts to 
relate urban development and rural change especially to locate available livelihood for 
the people after losing their land. 
 
Patterns from the past to the present 
To understand the pattern of customary land individualization, we need to look at several 
milestones happening within Olilit society. It will explain how the transformation of 
customary land was taken place from the past to the present time. However talking about 
the past, we need to consider the past as perceived and memorized by the people. That is 
why the time frame we set will start around 1940s. After Indonesian independence, there 
was a need to expand the governmental organization until the lowest level. This 
organization was led by sub-district head (SDH) who was responsible for several villages 
under its authority. In order to prepare this, there was a need to locate the capital.  
 
Hence in 1946, the sub-district government requested part of petuanan of Olilit to use as 
the sub-district capital, namely Saumlaki. It was a small town covering small area of 
settlement but dominated by mix of coconut plantation and shrub. Since the area was 
under customary management, the release of the area from customary land was 
necessary. The detachment had different meaning for village community and the 
government. The society perceived the government was given a usufruct right which 
would be reverted to the community when the community needed the land. But the 
government perceived the land had nothing to do anymore with community’ control.  
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These contradicting views had several implications to customary land control. While both 
SDH and community especially village government claimed the same authority, in fact 
the SDH was more powerful than the village government because he gained his authority 
from hierarchical order of government institutions. At that point, it was part of SDH’s 
authority to allocate the land within the town.  
 
At the same time, village government argued that based on the customs, the land 
supervisor and village government were the authorized body to allocate petuanan land in 
Olilit. But this would not be possible working in the reverse way on the SDH’s 
perspective. As a result, the land affairs in petuanan of Olilit had not involved the 
community so that when the SDH, using his authority, allocated some plots of land then 
sold them out to businessmen in the town6, the community could not stop this from 
happening7.  
 
The SDH were so powerful and override the customary use especially within the town 
territory under their authority. They were supposed to ask the consent of the customary 
leaders but they never ask the community or even involved them in any land affairs 
(Salembun, interview). As a result using this authority, the SDH sold many plots of land 
especially to local businessmen then later on the businessmen resold the land to other 
buyers.  
 
The process was going on and was not stopped. In fact, in 1970 central government 
requested the land for building fuel storage managed by Pertamina (state oil company). 
The location proposed was again inside the petuanan of the Olilits (kampong Lakteru) 
therefore the SDH Matekohi on the behalf of central government requested the land to be 
released. Having unpleasant experiences few years back, in order to get the land, the 
community asked the central government to pay some compensation fee. The 
compensation, IDR 10 million, was initially vested in marga who controlled the area but 
the village head who received it didn’t share with them.  
 
This was next milestone where the village was involved in the process of land release. In 
fact, it became obvious that the village head acted by solely him and took an advantage 
                                                 
6
 For instance Robert Tanbun known as Kiat, a chinese ethnic businessman held a large amount plots of 
land bought from SDH B. Koedoeboen (1987-1990) 
7
 The incumbent village head Salembun mentioned some of the SDHs who sold the land inside Saumlaki 
town: M. Arief (1958-1962); S. Adam, BA (1966-1970); A. Matekohi, BA (1970-1980); and B. 
Koedoeboen (1987-1990) 
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from that transaction. After the released of Pertamina area, the tension among the villager 
was ignited especially between village head and his supporters and the mangfaluruk 
groups.  
 
The tension was resolved partly by passing a village decree No. Pem 2/IV/15/1981 on 
27th of February 1981 to justify the rules of the game in land affair. This was a 
compromise solution between the conflicting parties. The main points in the decree are 
summarized as follows: (1) land affair is under the management of village government of 
Olilit including the released of customary land; (2) the role of the mangfaluruk is 
acknowledged and will be given 5 percent of the compensation fee and the rest goes to 
the village aiming at village development fund; (3) the village controls the unoccupied 
land or never been cultivated; and (4) the compensation consists of two elements that is 
the cultivators enjoy crops compensation and land compensation is taken by the village 
government. 
 
Looking at the points on this decree, it was not surprising that the people were still 
dissatisfied. For example at the point (2), while the authority was still centralized in 
village head, there was no guarantee that the fund would be managed efficiently. 
Although several village projects had been finished, these achievements were far from 
expectation (Belay, interview). Again at the last point, it was implied that the land and the 
trees were separated so that the benefit from it should be divided. To this point, the 
people felt cheated and demanded for the benefit share.  
 
Therefore the decree was revised in 1986 compromising with the demand of the 
protestors. The village head and some staffs agreed to adjust the benefit share consisted 
of 50 percent went to the seller, 35 percent went to the village’s trust fund, 10 percent 
went to the village’s staffs (village head and his staffs) and the 5 percent went to the 
mangfaluruk. Based on this arrangement, the people got a good reason to sell their 
holding individually. This also exacerbated individual land selling regardless of whether 
they owned the land by inheritance or claimed through coconut plantation. 
 
The share of the village staffs became smaller but it didn’t prevent them misappropriating 
from other’s share such as from trust fund’ share. While the land transaction controlled 
centrally by the village head, he was supposed to have transaction records. In fact, the 
land transactions were poorly recorded as confirmed by the incumbent village head and 
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several land buyers. Therefore, the likelihood of capturing benefit from the land 
transaction would certainly be greater.  
 
In 1993, as a result of prolonged tension several years before, the individual started 
transfering their holding through various ways. These ways would be explained in the 
next sub chapter.  
 
Finally, the last milestone was in 1999 after new district was established in this area. The 
land selling became more intensive especially because the district capital is growing and 
the demand of land for housing and other infrastructures is also increasing 
simultaneously. This process involves several actors not only individual who sold the 
land but also introduces local government (LG) as an actor in customary land affairs. The 
detail of this appropriation will also be explored separately in the following sub-chapters. 
 
The milestone of land affair in Olilit is summarized in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7 Historical pattern of land affairs in Olilit community 
1946: Saumlaki city 
became enclave in 
Petuanan of Olilit
1970: Government 
asked for land for 
fuels storage
1981: a village decree 
passed to manage 
land transaction
1986: revision of the 
decree preceded by 
distrust and tensions 
regarding to land 
compensation
1993: individual 
sold the land
1999: new district 
established; land selling 
became significant
ancient Olilit
 
Source: Field work interview (2006) 
 
Recent practices in individual land transaction 
As the individuals started cultivating coconut in customary land, they developed 
individual land relation to the land. Having the coconut grown on their estate, households 
are able to get a set bundle of rights comprising the right to use, to get benefit, to inherit 
and to alienate the land. Through this mechanism, individual got land ownership and 
ability to sell their holding as well.  
 
Furthermore, the individual land transaction mediated through the land market but the 
land market was imperfect as indicated by imperfect information and distorted land price. 
To sell the land, the seller has to find the buyer himself (Tandjaya, interview). The 
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information regarding the land availability such as the location and its size would be 
passed through a chain of personal network. In many cases, the seller goes to the buyer’s 
place in person to make an offer. Hence the information is not equally accessed by the 
potential buyers in the town.  
 
In terms of preference, the buyers are more interested in buying the land cultivated by 
coconut rather than bare land. Similarly the lands cultivated by annual food crops are less 
preferable. This is because the recent practice in customary land in Olilit has shown that 
by planting a coconut, the individual would get individual ownership of the access to use 
and extract the benefit from what he grows. On the contrary, the bare land or the land 
cultivated by annual food crops, it holds temporary access due to the shifting agriculture 
practices. According to the customs, everybody is able to use them as long as they are 
members of Olilit society.   
 
Should the potential buyer is interested in the offer; both the land owner and the buyer 
proceed to the next stage to survey the location and settles the deal. Whenever the buyer 
and the seller are ready, first, the land actually needs to be detached from the customary 
relation by issuing a land release letter (surat pelepasan hak). The letter is issued by 
village head undersigned with other village officers. The transaction would be considered 
illegal without having the letter afterwards.  
 
Second, to get a release letter after customary land transaction is important. The letter 
confirms that the land has perpetually been transferred to the buyer therefore the buyer 
has the right to use and extract the benefit from it concurrently. The letter also confirms 
that the land in question is free from any liability and should in the future someone else 
claim the land, the village head of Olilit is obliged to resolve the conflict. By getting the 
letter, the buyer has responsibility to complete any requirements regarding to legal aspect 
of the land including but not limited to the cost incurred from the process. The letter is 
signed by both the village head and the buyer. In addition to that acknowledgement is 
provided by the herald, the head of soa, village staff, and SDH.  
 
Up to this stage, the transaction is accomplished between the buyer and the seller. Having 
this paper on hand, the buyer pays the land’s price to the seller. The land price itself need 
to be divided among the village leaders according to the village regulation 1986 (see 
above).  
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Third, on the buyer side, he can directly use the land after he receives the release letter 
and proceeds to further stage such as apply for land certificate in the district land board 
(BPN). Formally, BPN will issue the land certificate within 3 months but it may be 
delayed due to incomplete application or the land in question may be in disputes 
(Batseran, interview). This process seems easy and cooperative but this is not always the 
case in the practice. The processes according to some applicants were time consuming 
and sometimes to make it fast, the applicants need to pay an extra cost.  
Land certificate or land insecurity? 
It is a common view among the potential buyers that there is a sense of insecurity dealing 
with an individual land transaction. This is because the transaction is just equipped with 
the land release letter and in some cases the letter isn’t secure enough to defend from 
other claims. For instance another buyer might have the same letter for the same plot of 
land. The notion of double sales is also important to reveal since it operates through two 
ways. First, the land sellers didn’t consult their decision to sell the land with the other 
families and second, due to poor records, the village head re-issued the letter for the same 
plot.  
 
Figure 8 The mark was placed on a bought land  
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In addition to that another dimension of insecurity was not only because of double sales, 
but also amid the process of issuing land certificate by BPN. As experienced by some 
buyers who applied for land certificate, they were ended by waiting their application for 
more that a year. There is a strong feeling of insecurity when the original release letter 
was submitted to the BPN, should there be any calamities so the letter is lost, the 
applicant would be more insecure. Therefore some buyers prefer keeping the original 
letter with him when applying for the certificate (Tandjaya, interview).  
 
The certificate is a clear example of the working proof in the formal law (Soto, 2000). 
Whereas the community defines the coconut estates as an indicator of secured individual 
right so as the benefits derived from them. It means that the community and the 
government interpret the issue of land security differently and this should not be 
contradicted with each other since it works at different level.  
The motives 
Looking at the motivation of land selling in Olilit, it can be distinguished between 
personal motives and distress sales. Personal motives concerning the land selling is taken 
place as the seller is aware of the consequences of his decision. He might have 
anticipated the change after he sold the land. This is different from distress sales; it has to 
do with coping strategy after shock situation. Hence the sales would enable the seller to 
stabilize short term income but reduce their wealth in the long term income-generating 
opportunity (Ruben and Masset, 2003:484).  
 
Box 1 The Motives of Individual Land Selling 
Rinus Kuai, one of the elders, told that he sold his holding of 1,500 m2 in 1998 because he 
needed money to treat his wounded son in an accident and took his son to a bigger hospital in 
province capital, Ambon. When he made this decision and the buyer offered the installment 
payment, he agreed as he had limited choice at that time. He got IDR 11.25 million from this 
transaction. On the other hand, different story was told by Buang Belay, a young man works as a 
driver for others’ motor-taxi business. He was the only son in his family therefore inherited from 
his father several plots of coconut plantation. He sold 2,000 m2 of his plot in 2003 and got IDR 
20 million. He spent the money for renovating his house, buying a home audio system and buying 
a second-hand motorcycle. This was a leap in his life, he started his own business in motor-taxi 
transportation. 
 
Source: field work (2006) 
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Box 1 illustrates the contrast between personal motive in one hand and the distress sales 
on the other hands. As shown above, the different generation seems to have different 
decision. The elders wanted to keep the land as far as they could while the youth 
attempted to deal with changing situation. Therefore when the young decided to sell some 
of their holdings, they had made calculation of something which should be done to 
compensate their lost from accessing no land afterwards.  
 
On the contrary, the elder also made his efforts to adapt. However it was not easy when 
they wanted to leave agriculture sector and involve in wage labor in the town, the jobs 
might only be suitable for the young. At the end, the viable opportunity for them was 
going back to agriculture sector. The people who still have some plots to work on are in 
better situation than those who have already sold out their holding. In the first case, 
although he lost some plots of land, he still had other plots on which he has been working 
until now.  
 
The modes of land transfer  
The transfer of land from the hands of Olilit people to the outsiders took place at least 
from three various ways: (1) requesting the land through kinship relation; (2) typical land 
selling-buying; (3) land appropriation for public use by LG. Requesting the land through 
kinship relation is a common practice in Tanimbar society. This practice shows that 
having kinship relationship (duan-lolat or wife giver and wife taker) including father-
foster child relationship ease the land transaction as illustrated in the Box 2.  
 
Under this mode, it relies on social network as a means to access the land. In terms of 
reducing transaction costs social relations provide a means to do so. For the buyer, the 
costs is reduced in relation to collecting information and verifying the status of the land 
he wanted to buy; it must be free from any disputes. At the same time, the advantage 
from the land holder’ side was he didn’t need to find potential buyers which costs a lot of 
time. The use of kinship relation for land transfer opened the opportunity for both parties 
to negotiate especially for the land value and the condition for payment.   
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Box 2 Land transfer via kinship relation 
In 1993, house Fasse detached an area of 2 hectares of customary land to one of Chinese 
businessman named Y. Samadara. He wanted to build a real estate area in Saumlaki. This 
transaction was possible and easily closed by a contract since Samadara’s wife was adopted as a 
foster-child by the house Fasse. This practice was a common in the Tanimbar Islands especially 
for the new-comers; they are trying to build relation with the indigenous expecting the protection 
and help when they need it. Thus the nature of the relationship is reciprocal; foster-children are 
expected to behave such a way that the children usually do to their parents such as supporting the 
parents in any difficulties, taking care of them and so on. Similarly, Foster-parent would treat his 
foster-children in a way that he does to his own children. Though the wife wasn’t an indigenous 
person and she asked to be adopted, house Fasse accepted this offer since the husband was a 
businessman.  
 
Having such relationship opened the opportunity for the husband to access the land as he was 
before considered as an outsider. To request the land, Samadara visited his foster-father bringing 
a bottle of palm wine and the money for its cork as a medium to convey his request. In theory, the 
amount of money for contribution was voluntary however Fasse asked him to provide IDR 50 
million for an exchange. 
 
(Source: Filipus Fasse, interview) 
 
Requesting the land using this mode was not considered as commercial transaction in the 
past. It was a practice where an exchange among kinsmen took place and not only 
relating to the land exchange but also for bride wealth and gifts exchange. This is what 
Polanyi (cited in Eggertsson, 1990) called as transaction mode and applied when the 
market prices were absent. Indeed in Olilit society, it is a common practice and works as 
an alternative to price making mechanism (North cited in Eggertsson, 1990)  
 
However such practice has been changing over generation, the people have been 
exploiting the mode to take an advantage. Hence it is not surprising the mode has been 
facilitating commercial customary land exchange as seen in the Box 2.  
 
The second mode is a typical selling-buying which is the most frequent land transfer from 
the past to the present date and it is more commercial in nature. As it has been elaborated 
above, the mode is characterized by imperfect information and distorted land price. While 
the idea of imperfect information has already been elaborated, this is to reveal how land 
price is determined and distorted in some ways.  
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The role of village head was inseparable from the process of determining the land price. 
The village head determined the land price as part of his job to manage and regulate land 
affairs in Olilit society (see village decree 1981). In the last ten years, the land price was 
about IDR 2,500/m2 and has increased to IDR 3,500/m2 in 1998.  
 
The regulated price in practice was ineffective to prevent the outsiders from buying the 
land (Salembun, interview) and distorted in the sense that it didn’t reflect the equilibrium 
price. Several cases have shown that some buyers were willing to pay above the regulated 
price as a result the land holder gained from the excess price. As experienced by Kuai 
(interview), he gained about 5,000/m2 from the land he sold of IDR 7,500/m2 while the 
rest was vested in the village trust fund.  
 
In relation to that the expected land price at community level is far different from the 
expected land price of commercial sectors (businessmen in the town). Businessmen have 
their own calculation so they expect the land price would be around IDR 20-50 
thousand/m2 (Tandjaya, interview). 
 
Again, this is not only market force determining the land price but also from negotiation. 
How much the holder would gain from the transaction depends on the outcome of the 
negotiation. In case of distress sales, the holders seem to have few choices therefore it is 
likely that they would receive the price offered by the buyer. Unlike distress sales, 
personal sales get a wide range of options so that the offered prices were better and 
relatively higher. Or even when the price is too low, the seller might retain the land and 
sell it later.  
 
The last mode was the local government appropriated the customary right for public 
infrastructure such as road. This was among others facilitated by district regulation 
(Perda) No 9/2002 concerning spatial plan for Saumlaki town. Based on that spatial plan, 
the infrastructure such as main road and district offices were going to be built in 
petuanan of Olilit. Thus, it is not surprising that the land appropriation at this moment 
has mostly taken place within petuanan of Olilit. In addition to that, the plan has included 
some other areas in other villages to be used for public infrastructure for instance marine 
harbor and local trading area are going to be built in Lauran village.  
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Box 3 Land compensation for the main road infrastructure 
The project is covering the area of 17.2 ha for the main road, 40 m in width and 4,3 km in length. 
When the project was started in 2002, it was located covering two petuanans that is Olilit’s and 
Sifnana’s. To compensate the people, the series of calculation had been made to count the area to 
be cleared including the crops on it then a list of beneficiaries was prepared. From the lists, the 
LG started paying the compensation at the end of 2002.  
 
Due to some administrative matters; the money was allocated in phases in the yearly district 
budget (APBD). Meaning that some beneficiaries would get the payment while the rest had to 
wait for the next budget year. This problem led to a dispute between the district government and 
the land holder. During the field work, the locals were protesting the government to pay their 
compensation. Besides asking for payment, some other agendas were also raised like to increase 
the compensation value as well as to add new claimants in the compensation’ scheme. The latter 
led to the increase of the district budget and provoked more tension between LG and the people.  
 
Source: field work (2006) 
 
As we have seen in the Box 3, infrastructure projects run by LG seemed obvious and the 
same would happen again in the future but for different project, scale and location. It 
means that future access to the land by local community would be threatened by this kind 
of appropriation. At some points, the locals would also benefit from being compensated 
however it would depend strongly on how efficient households use the money.  
 
In relation to that, the amount of the compensation fee was another issue leading to recent 
tension. Although both LG and rural claimants had agreed for the compensation base 
value of IDR 5,000/m2, the people felt that it was lower than expected. Moreover the 
recent inflation has increased basic needs’ price hence the compensation fee was 
undervalued. For instance compensation for one meter square of land even can’t afford 
one kg of rice costs of IDR 6,000/kg.  
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Figure 9 Main road project in Saumlaki town 
 
 
The impacts and consequences 
The impacts and consequences of land transfer in Olilit will be discussed in the light of 
its impact to rural livelihood. The land individualization increases a concern of land 
scarcity and affecting agriculture sector in this village. As it has been shown in Chapter 2 
the main activities of Olilit people are still based on food crops farming and maintaining 
coconut plantation. Hence when many land plots has been transferred to the outsiders, the 
availability of land for agriculture activities will be in shortage. At the same time, the 
plots that have been cultivated by coconut trees are relatively irreversible when it needs 
to be restored to bare land. Hence the space for doing shifting cultivation becomes more 
and more narrow.  
 
The young generation encountered a problem of scarcity of bare land when they wanted 
to continue working for agriculture sector. They may cultivate crops in between coconut 
trees, though the land fertility was far less than fallow land (Youth leader, interview). 
Hence it is not surprising for the youth; they prefer working at non-farm wage labor 
sector such as docker, driver and motor-taxi driver.  
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In terms of income generating activities, the wage labor is very attractive though it 
remains insecure to some extent. The laborers at any time are situated in uncertainty as 
the employer may end the jobs without prior notice. This is different to another type of 
wage labor as a civil servant. However, only few people with skills and advance 
education who are able to work there. The people who work as wage labor in town just 
rely on their lower skill and physical strength.  
 
Hence, the majorities of people in Olilit would be likely affected by the enduring 
customary land transfer to the outsiders. In the future, what are they going to do without 
having access to the land? This is contrast to what happen with the land after purchased 
by the businessmen in the town. The lands are accumulated for other purposes for 
instance Apinga (interview) accumulated 5 ha land of which 2 ha had been taken over by 
the LG built for public attorney office. Whereas, with the remaining 3 ha, he intends to 
keep as a future investment.  
 
In brief, the excessive customary land transfer to the outsiders in the town might affect 
agriculture sector in this area by means of reducing agriculture land and transferring its 
labors to wage labors sector in the town. The land accumulation which has been taken 
place was not aimed at advance agriculture development but merely for future 
speculation. 
 
Box 4 The Attitude Toward Money  
Fasse, an elder, has 4 sons and 2 daughters. Among his sons, three of them are working for civil 
servant. The third son graduated with a master’s degree and had just retired as district 
parliamentary member. Since he was young he worked hard and planted so many coconut 
plantations which later on he sold out. He spent the money among others for paying his 
children’ education and buying some cars used for public transportation.   
 
On the contrary, some villagers didn’t spend the money efficiently. An observation by a civil 
servant in 2002 illustrated that after receiving the land compensation from LG, some households 
bought goods like satellite receiver and home audio system. Therefore on that day, these 
luxurious goods in the town’ stores were all sold out.  
 
Source: Field work (1996) 
 
Concerning how the people spent their money is another issue. Several patterns of money 
spending have been identified and elaborated in Box 1. In addition to that, to spend the 
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money on long term investment has been a choice, especially children education and 
movable goods. (see Box 4) 
 
The second case in Box 4 shows how wasteful the people manage the financial resources. 
Despite the huge amount of money they got, it would not improve their livelihood at all. 
Therefore the impact to the people will be obvious and evident, in the words of youth 
leader: “when the lands are sold out, what are the Olilit people going to eat in the future?” 
 
Institutional Change on Customary land tenure 
This section analyzes institution in the context of institutional structure (Feeder and 
Feeny, 1991) mainly related to institutional arrangement on petuanan in Olilit. The 
discussion concerning institutional change will be enriched by a closer look at the roles of 
the actors in customary land management in Olilit. It is also involved not only the 
insiders but also the outsiders whose behaviors are shaped by various access mechanisms 
(Ribot and Peluso, 2003).  
 
The institution works in the context of case study namely petuanan. In the property 
classification (for instance Bromley and Feeny, 1992; Otsuka and Place, 2001), the 
identical concept to petuanan is communal property right or customary tenure institution. 
The latter definition emerges from the recognition of individual ownership originated 
from exclusive use right on cultivated land within the communal management. This is 
also a critique to an old-school of customary right in Indonesia led by Vollenhoven 
(Haar, 1948). The group control, as Vollenhoven suggests, doesn’t mean that communal 
enjoys the common benefit equally instead some exclusion might be applied for 
minorities and marginalized groups. In reality, petuanan works with the communal 
principle but here the group also controls individual ownership within communal 
property.  
 
Petuanan system in case of Olilit, as we have shown above, regulate who has the access 
to the land either communal access or individual access, what benefits can be extracted 
from common resources such as land and the sea and who control the allocation of 
resources among the people. One of the early arrangements the community had made was 
unification pledge which set the basic foundation for the next generation how resources 
management should be. Other recent arrangements were village decree in 1981 and 1986. 
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Besides these arrangements, many others were made mainly unwritten law based on the 
customs.  
 
Institution doesn’t only regulate what can and can not be done but also what sanction 
should be applied for any offensive behavior. In case of Olilit, sanctions related to 
customary land tenure are implicitly enforced. It means that the enforcement would rely 
on the out worldly power to give the sanction so that the outlaw got bad luck or even the 
loss of life (Bohm, 1995:17). This kind of sanction is common and effective in any 
traditional society but it is getting weaker over time.  
 
In this paper, the break down of customary institution can be seen as a result of the 
appropriation by the elites and urbanization process which bring new value of money 
economy. The interaction among actors with respect to customary land tenure also 
indicates a struggle between these values to be adapted by the society.  
 
In analyzing institutional change in Olilit, a closer look at the roles of each actor is 
essential. At the first stage, the role of village head in changing the arrangement was very 
obvious. The village head was so dominant because he had access to authority. By 
looking at this access, it provides him the ability to control the society and the resources 
as well. To illustrate how the power was transferred to the new village head, when he was 
inaugurated, all leaders who sat on the stone boat bestowed him their valuables as a 
symbol that the village head had assembled all powers within village. Hence it is implied 
that the village head is the powerful actor to decide what is good or bad for the village 
society.  
 
Speaking of domination it is very probable that the village head becomes authoritarian. In 
addition to that the length of ruling period provides a means for him to be a dictator. In 
the case of Olilit, as far as people could remember, there have been four village heads.  
Until recently one of them ruled Olilit for almost 30 years or more (see Table 2).  
 
Table 2 The names of the village head and their ruling period since 1940s 
Village head Started from Ended on Ruling period (years) 
Modesus Naturaman 1940s 1987 ± 30 
M Fanumbi 1987 1997 10 
W Batlayeri 1997 2005 8 
Sam Salembun 2006 On going 6 *) 
*): a period according to district regulation, however village head can be re-elected. 
Source: Field work 
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It becomes clear then by looking at Table 2 and Figure 7 that on the period of 1940s – 
1987, the arrangement on land specifically petuanan of Olilit had been undergoing a 
transformation very rapidly. It didn’t stop anyway instead the successors continued the 
process of individualization. 
 
In spite of this, the role of elders and other customary leaders need to be considered 
during the process of change. In Olilit community, the knowledge especially related to 
history of village and migration process is vested in the elders and the customary leaders. 
Based on this knowledge, the elders allocated the authority to control the petuanan to 
particular marga families. The marga in question then employs the officer of land 
supervisor.  
 
The knowledge of the history becomes important to strengthen their position regarding 
resources allocation. Realizing the importance of this some people attempted to challenge 
the interpretation of customary law in order to get better access to the resources. They 
gained formal education but in the traditional system they are considered as the 
commoners. Hence we can say that education plays a role in changing the way the society 
views customary land relation.  
 
Access to authority also works in looking at the role of SDH when they were responsible 
for managing the sub-district area including the Saumlaki area; they divided the land 
within the town into several plots then sold them to the businessmen. Despite the fact that 
the SDH was an outsider on duty, his position made him able to control the land within 
the town. Similarly the district head had convinced the Olilit to let go the land being 
appropriated for public use. As a top decision maker at the district level, the district head 
used his power to persuade the people. In addition to his access to authority, he was 
advantaged by the fact that he is also an Olilit’ descendant which gave him legitimate 
access to the Olilit’ land. Having two means of accesses simultaneously made it easier for 
him to influence and take control over customary land in Olilit. In fact, the Olilits were 
relatively cooperative with such development project because of these reasons. 
 
It has been explained previously that the outsiders only have usufruct right for a certain 
period of time and the right they got is inalienable. It means that the outsiders by any 
means don’t have access to customary land in Olilit. However, the recent practices have 
shown that to transfer customary land to the outsider is applicable through kinship 
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relation and land commoditization. The former mode provides a way for the outsiders to 
access the land.  Hence immersing themselves in kinship relation with rural people would 
open the chance to access further access mechanism such as access to negotiation and 
social relation and finally granted them access to the land 
 
Indeed access to social identity need to be exercised first before exercising access to 
negotiation and social relation. This would operate through among others patronage 
relation such as father-foster child relationship. Having such relationship eases the 
outsiders to get the land they need. It is definite that businessmen would only be 
interested in getting the land for their investment; hence it is also true they are not 
interested in doing any advance agriculture. Regardless of land fertility, they would buy it 
whenever possible. In many cases, the businessmen are more interested in doing real 
estate projects.  
 
In addition to that access to the land is also mediated through access to capital. By 
looking at businessmen’ interest at customary land in Olilit, they use their dominance in 
the local economy and the financial means to access the land through land 
commercialization. Thus it is not surprising that the businessmen are the most preferred 
land buyers.  
 
To conclude institutional change from the access perspective, it is shown that institutional 
arrangement in petuanan land provides the way in which the resources are accessed by 
the members of society. It is implied that those who are not members of the community 
are excluded. However access perspective provides the explanation of what happened in 
customary land in Olilit; anyone actually could access to the customary land as long as 
they have power to control, facilitated by among others access to capital, social identity, 
negotiation and social relation, knowledge and access to authority.  
Who Benefits from Land Individualization? 
This section would argue that the benefits from land individualization have been captured 
by the elites. The elites we are talking about here are the governing elites who consist of 
village elites and district elites. The main argument is that the roles the elites played in 
the change of institutional arrangement have to do with the attempts to maintain their 
position and political support. Therefore they would take advantage from any available 
resources to survive, dubbed the elite capture.  
 
 42 
The long ruling period of village head, as we have seen in the case of Olilit community, 
has involved several issues. First, the village heads were able to capture the benefit from 
the land individualization among others facilitated by the centralized leadership system 
through unlimited governing period. For instance the village head M. Naturaman 
resigned from his post because he was too old and so did the village head M. Fanumbi.  
The system provides a means to allow the village head to govern whatever they like 
including to change the institutional arrangement.  
 
In relation to public choice theory (Grindle and Thomas, 1991), there is little evidence to 
say that the change in petuanan arrangement for example in 1981 and 1986 has to do 
with an effort to maintain the position and political support. In fact, the leadership system 
provided an advantage for the elected village head to stay in the position as long as he 
could. This was also becoming feasible since the check and balance mechanisms in the 
village level were less developed. Hence the reason of changing arrangement in these 
periods was more on expanding the village head’s control over petuanan.  
 
In line to this the issue of fund’ management and its accountability are still relevant. 
While 35% of the land profit is vested in village trust fund, so far there are no significant 
fund monitoring.  Therefore it would be reasonable to argue that the fund might be 
captured by those who control it, in this case is the village head. Another indication was 
the poor records regarding how much land has been released from the customary land.  
 
Recently the incumbent village head is going to increase the land price to minimum of 
IDR 50 thousand/m2 in order to limit the land transfer. The idea is to make the land 
affordable only to those who have the money and it is expected that the impact would be 
less land sales. However, it is almost certain that the new arrangement would transfer 
more land to the businessmen who have the capacity to afford. On the other hands, the 
contribution to village trust fund would be higher. This would lead to more questions on 
accountability. There is every doubt that the fund would be secure from manipulation.  
 
At the same time, the government succeeded to appropriate the customary land for public 
infrastructure mainly because of the persuasion of the district head. He convinced the 
people to shift from production sectors to services sector backed with the fact that Olilit 
village is located close to the town. Furthermore, he used the newly established district 
issue as a means to negotiate with the people regarding to compensation fee. He did 
persuade not the village people, but he also convinced the businessmen, who had land 
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ownership on some plots in the proposed road project, to cooperate and he promised to 
grant them other district projects as a return. 
 
Beyond this fact, we can conclude that the behavior of the district head corresponded to 
public choice argument. He attempted to maintain his power especially preparing himself 
as one of the candidates running for the first direct district election in 2007. Thus it 
became important for him to offer the best development’ achievements and experiences 
in governing the district. While this has nothing to do with the preference of voting for 
Olillit society, they would certainly vote the candidate originated from their village even 
though this can lead to unpredicted future for the some people as a result of petuanan’ 
appropriation.  
 
Urban Development and Rural Change 
Institutional change can also be seen from the different way especially putting this 
discussion on the debate between radical and liberal perspective. In the context of 
evolutionary land tenure, the radical view argued that institutional change is a product of 
class structure and struggle (Angelsen, 1997). On the other hand, the liberal argued that 
the society demands for institutional change as a result of modernization interfering pre-
capitalist society. Both of them are looking at the same process of agriculture 
commercialization as a root cause of individualization of property right but using 
different perspectives.  
 
This paper would argue here that the process of agriculture commercialization has little to 
do with land transfer and individualization in Olilit village. Instead the individualization 
takes place as a result of processes and tensions during urban development in this area.  
 
First we need to see why this agriculture commercialization doesn’t fit to explain the case 
study. Some evidences have been shown especially indicated by the role of coconut 
trading during Dutch colonial times; it became main commodity to be exported overseas 
among others to support industrialization in the west. Despite its importance, coconut 
commercialization was just an early indication of individualization. In fact, as predicted 
by the radical approach, with reference to this area the emergence of new class (capitalist 
agriculture vs. landless labor) based on the new property institution didn’t occur.  
 
Here, modernization plays a significant contribution to rural change in this area. 
Modernization has introduced money economy system where the exchange of goods 
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needs to be completed by the exchange of the money. Therefore, the commercialization 
of agriculture finds its way to explain why the people cultivated perennial crops like 
coconut; it becomes a means to supply the cash income to the households. One of the 
effects of the money economy system was the increasing demand of luxurious goods as 
seen in Table 3.  
 
Table 3 Numbers of HH possessed luxurious goods 
TV Satellite Receiver Village/Town 
1996 2003 1996 
OLILIT 150 695 28 
SAUMLAKI 640 1125 110 
Source: LPEM FEUI on PODES (1996, 2003) 
 
While agriculture commercialization becomes a means to access cash money, it missed a 
link to the next path as predicted in radical approach. Hence, liberal approach provides a 
more feasible explanation. It will fit with the path proposed by urban development 
scholars for instance Tacoli (1998) and Fuys, Mwangi and Dohrn (2006).  
 
The path was urbanization which has an implication to give the customary land a value. 
As we have seen in the case study, the customary land gained a monetary value during 
the town development. The town has been growing in space as well as number of 
inhabitants. The demand for space was not only fulfilled by the area within the town but 
also over the town’s boundary. That is why the most likely area to be used for the 
expansion was the closest from the town which was the petuanan of Olilit. 
 
Another effect of urbanization was the growing of urban employment which mostly 
based on wage labor sectors. These kinds of employment are very attractive to young 
people especially because it offers immediate cash income. Among the young, the 
number of those who work in the town is an indication of land scarcity problem. 
However, it showed the opposite trend among the elders in the past. They were also 
involved in wage labor sector but this has nothing to do with access to land whatsoever. 
The demand for immediate cash income became the main reason since the agriculture 
sector offered just seasonal income.  
A new value for land property 
The value of customary land in Olilit has been gradually transformed. In the past, the 
land had an important value for some reasons like being source of livelihood and it had 
social and religious functions. Hence the value perceived by the people was more on non-
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economic value rather than economic value. However the commoditization process 
mediated by agriculture product transaction has led to the integration of rural economy 
into the market. As the market penetration went deeper; the needs were expanding 
creating increasing demand on secondary and tertiary needs such as luxurious goods. 
 
It is understandable since the social mobility was shaped by the clans’ nobility and 
heirlooms possession. For many of Olilit, they were trying to challenge existing social 
structure by using different means that is the luxurious goods possession. At least they 
attempted to reinterpret what social status meant for them.  
 
While demands for secondary and tertiary goods were increasing, it became a threat to 
institutional arrangement in Olilit. This has been predicted by Baland and Platteau (1996) 
that a new value for the land commodity would get rid of some attributes such as sacred 
and taboo. In relation to that the reliance to old magical beliefs also has been weakened 
over the generation. The sanctions which part of institutional arrangement became 
ineffective. Partly because some people might refuse to accept such beliefs and offer an 
interpretation as new values. 
 
In brief, market penetration has begun new episode of customary land management by 
first, changing customary land institution. And second, the modernity might generate 
individualism which diverts local community from the importance of solidarity and social 
cohesion. As a consequence it drives more land to be detached from customary ties.  
 
To conclude all the arguments in this chapter, a rural area is undergoing a process of 
changing. External factors such as government policy, urban development and so on are 
often justifiable to look at this change combined with the internal factors concerning 
customary institutional structure which shaped by various access mechanism. In addition 
to that, the value within society is changing facilitated by commodity economy. The new 
value of individualization, after all, drives people’s motivation to detach more land from 
customary tie.  
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Chapter 5 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Access to the land still becomes a problem especially in developing countries. At the 
same time the communal societies who are in better situation regarding such access 
undergoing a process of land individualization. Likewise in Olilit community, the land 
initially was held under the control of marga groups but gradually it encountered a 
process of individualization. As a concluding remark, it will be organized to summarize 
the features of customary land in Olilit followed by how the process of individualization 
has been going through and lastly trying to answer research question.  
 
The main feature of customary land in Olilit community is the marga control the access 
to the land by employing specific officer acting as land supervisor. The groups of marga 
will ensure that the land accessible for the whole community. By this arrangement, it is 
communal in nature but also recognized individual claim on the cultivated land. Thus, the 
marga control the land in a way that communal access and individual access work 
simultaneously.  
 
Bare land has different right’ attributes than cultivated one. And among the cultivated 
one, coconut estate or any perennial crops estate gained more permanent use than annual 
food crop field. Individual claim sourced from having coconut estate and it has distinct 
right such as right to inherit becoming a strong indication of individualization. Hence in 
case of land commercialization, it has to acquire one of this attributes such as coconut 
estate, inherited land or any perennial crop’ estate. 
 
The land transfer in Olilit has shown some patterns that first, the land has transferred to 
the outsiders, second, the land has been transferred to non-agriculture purposes, and third, 
the important consumers who buy the land from Olilit community is businessmen in the 
town.  
 
Having land individualization process in Olilit community, there are three modes 
working for land transfer. First, building kinship relation with the community provides a 
way for an outsider to access the land. It has some advantages of reducing the transaction 
costs in terms of getting information on the status of the land. 
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The second mode is concerning typical land selling-buying which has been the most 
frequent land transfer since the last 20 years. In relation to this, land market which 
facilitated the land transaction is not well functioned. The reason was the information 
among seller and buyer weren’t exchanged freely and the land price was distorted in 
some ways. As a result, the price didn’t reflect best allocation of land as some 
businessmen also did internal accumulation. However this has to do with speculative 
behavior rather than agrarian accumulation process.  
 
Selling their holding was motivated by personal interest and distress sales. The first is 
concerning individual who thinks that working on the land-based sector doesn’t give 
much income so instead of keeping it, it is better to sell it and get money from it to start 
another business. As it has been suggested in the paper, some of them started motor-taxi 
business. On the other hand, the distress sales reflect vulnerability of rural people toward 
shocks, so the selling was happening by force and might be involuntary.  
 
The third mode is land appropriation by LG as a consequence of urban expansion. Due to 
establishment of new district in this region, the district capital started developing and 
expanding next to urban periphery. By looking at this trend, what happened in Olilit was 
not stopped here but it is certain that this kind of appropriation would happen again in 
other villages for different project and scale.  
 
At the moment, the growing of the town is a blessing in disguise for the rural people 
living in the surrounding. Several job opportunities are available and attract especially the 
young to get off from agriculture sector. In the case study this effect is very obvious and 
generates further implication. Starting self-business could be an option, working as wage 
labor could be also another one and many others else as well.  
 
However, this success story above might be undermined with the facts that some 
households were so inefficient in spending the money they got from land transaction. 
They often tempted to spend the money on luxurious goods whereas it would be better 
for them to spend it for future investment such as children education or saving account. 
Second, to shift labor force from agriculture to urban wage labor may not be as smooth as 
it seems to be. At the moment, the demand for unskilled and manpower labor are very 
high but this type of work doesn’t offer any value added in terms of income increment. 
Furthermore, since the jobs are mostly unskilled, the more difficult it become for them to 
compete when the younger labor force entered the job market. At some point of time, 
they will be wiped out.  
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And the third is concerning to what should be done in order to adapt with such changes 
since the land transfer to the outsiders seems to be unstoppable in the future. As the paper 
suggest, the Olilit people need to think twice before deciding to sell their holding. Instead 
they need to prepare an escape plan from being crushed after losing the land. Although 
the investment opportunities in this area are limited, a long term investment such as 
children education might be one of the options.  
 
According to the paper, the main factor contribute to the process of land individualization 
in Olilit village is the change of customary institutional arrangement. It was facilitated by 
the government policy regarding to the land use for local economic development. At the 
same time, urban area is progressing increased the demand of the land for urban 
settlement. Both factors intertwine with the fact that access to the customary land in Olilit 
is shaped by various access mechanisms. There are also several actors involved in this 
issue especially the outsiders creating pressure on demand of land. In addition to that the 
actors within the groups are getting more important to enhance the process internally by 
modifying the customary arrangement.  
 
In answering who benefit from land individualization process in Olilit is a little bit fuzzy. 
The paper doesn’t want to make an extreme polarization between who benefit and who 
lost. Instead, the actors related to land individualization process take both benefit and loss 
at different ways, levels and scales. Furthermore, the benefits so as lost were not always 
in monetary terms, but also non-monetary terms for instance the district head enjoyed 
popularity in promoting local development after the success of road project development.  
 
These benefits weren’t necessarily enjoyed by the elites only but also other non elites. 
However, there is a consistent pattern as expected by the theory that larger benefits were 
captured by the elites and the other non elites enjoyed a relatively minor benefit streams.  
 
In summary, this research strongly advice the people assessing thoroughly their decision 
regarding sell their holding. It doesn’t mean that they must keep their holding at all cost 
so as they have to sold the land out soon. Hence, the decision they made should be based 
on a voluntary basis with sufficient information at hand. Yet again the people need to 
anticipate the future considering the recent trend of land individualization seems to be 
inevitable.  
= 000 = 
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 Appendix 1 List of Clan, Mangfaluruk and House Seated in Ritual Officials 
 
 Soa Marga (clan) House Mangfaluruk Ritual Officials 
Matkus 
Kelbulan 
Metantomwate 
Oratmangun 
Romrome 
Fasse 
Ranmaru 
Batbual 
Werempinan 
Iyat-taborat 
Fenanlampir 
Ranbalak 
Londar 
Rumyane keliompar 
Kuai 
Fairsalili 
Futuembun 
Slyarwar 
Batseran 
Matkus   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Luturmele First speaker 
Batmomolin 
Ngilawayan 
Maselar 
Sikafir 
Kelitubun 
Rangkoli 
Futunanembun 
Polikadu 
Teftutul 
Luturmele 
Salembun Waranmaselembun 
Buarlely 
Fenyapwain 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Fadersyair Herald 
Kempirmase 
Sermatang 
Das Melawas  
Ndriti 
Ngilamele 
  
  
  
  
Waranmaselembun 
Ngilamele-Ranmalai 
Ranmalai 
Ngilamele-Ranmalai 
Left rudder 
Malisngoran 2nd speaker 
Melsasail 
Watumlawar 
Ivakdalam Dole 
Dasfamudi 
Malisngoran 
Samangun 
  
  
  
  
Lartutul Mangsompe 
Luturmase 
O
lil
it 
Si
de
 
Ivakdalam 
Ivakdalam Dae 
Batlayeri 
Samangun 
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Appendix 1 (Contd.) 
 
 Soa Marga (clan) House Mangfaluruk Ritual Officials 
Fanumbi Nifmasar Sarbunan Sarbunan First speaker 
Somarwain Mangsompe 
Batfutu Right rudder 
Tormyar 
Batmwerar 
Boin 
Somarwain 
  
  
Batsire Herald 
Belay 2nd speaker 
Karyaain 
Ibyaru 
Yempormase 
Batsire 
Batmomolin Rumrayar 
Belay 
Batmomolin 
Samponu Awerar 
Rananmase 
Samponu 
Watumlawar 
Laratmase 
Batmomolin 
Fa
n
u
m
bi
 
si
de
 
 
 
  
Lakteru 
Rangkore 
Watumlawar 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Source: group discussion with elders of Olilit (L. Belay, E. Batmomolin, P. Fenyapwain) 
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Appendix 2 Kinship Relationship and Organization in Olilit 
 
 
Village
Soa Soa Soa
Clan (marga) Clan (marga)
House (matarumah) House (matarumah)
household
household
household
household
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Appendix 3 List of Key Informants 
 
No NAME  DATE OF INTERVIEW ROLES PLAYED IN THE SOCIETY 
1 Rein Matatula August 3, 2006 Forestry agency staff 
2 Petrus Saiya August 3, 2006 District land board staff 
3 Freddy Tandjaya August 3, 2006 Businessman, land buyer 
4 Proto Lololuan August 4, 2006 Public work agency staff 
5 Pino Tuasuun August 4, 2006 Agriculture agency staff 
6 Lusje I Latumakulita August 4, 2006 Forewoman, Public work agency 
7 Rinus Kuai August 5, 2006 Olilits, land seller 
8 Sam Salembun August 6, 2006 Olilits, village head 
9 Freddy Batseran August 7, 2006 Head of district land board 
10 Anton Fenanlampir August 7, 2006 Olilits, head of youth group 
11 Cos Lolunlun August 8, 2006 Head of general affair section, District office 
12 Yohanes Buarlely August 8, 2006 Olilits, a docker 
13 Atibaman August 9, 2006 Olilits, an elder 
14 Filipus Fasse August 11, 2006 Olilits, elder, land seller 
15 Apinga August 10, 2006 Businessman, land buyer 
16 Buang Belay August 11, 2006 Olilits, land seller, ojek 
17 Laurensius Belay August 9, 2006 Olilits, village secretary 
18 E Batmomolin August 11, 2006 Olilits, a teacher 
19 P. Fenyapwain August 11, 2006 Olilits, an elder 
20 Sil Salembun August 13, 2006 Olilits, a teacher 
21 Brampi Moriolkosu August 17, 2006 Law section staff, District Office 
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